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Abstract
This paper examines the relevance of economic freedom and elements of privatization 
reforms—provisions in the law, including new private entry, consumer choice, price regulation, 
and fuel subsidies—to the calculation of privatization’s effect on outcome variables such as the 
price of electricity, access to electricity, and average costs of electricity. Evidence from this paper 
suggests that privatization without controls or interaction terms increases all of the outcomes, but 
when economic freedom and the elements of privatization reforms are taken into account, prices 
decrease, access to electricity increases, and average costs decrease.
Introduction
Privatization  is  a  controversial  policy  reform with  various  effects.  The  literature  has 
examined privatization reforms across the world and across industries (Pollitt 1995, Competition 
in Electricity Markets 2001, Kitchens 2016). Broadly, the mission of this research is to inform 
policy-makers  about  the  effectiveness  of  privatizing  public  services.  It  also  aims  to  form a 
criterion for constructing different types of privatization reforms. Concomitantly, this paper will 
explore the effectiveness of privatization reforms in their political environments. 
I address the controversy head on by analyzing the effect of a key theme which motivates 
privatization  reforms:  economic  freedom.  Privatization  is  typically  classed  as  a  policy  of 
economic liberalization which carries  with it  some weight  and bears  upon the ideologies  of 
policy-makers.  Though  privatization  reforms  are  typically  considered  freedom-oriented,  they 
often take place in countries  which are not  relatively economically free.  The motivation for 
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reform may not spring from the intentions of partisans,  but  from pragmatism or some other 
reason. This leads to the question: would it matter if a privatization reform took place in a freer 
country?
I use the fixed effects model—for electric utilities and for years—and include a control 
for economic freedom and privatization. I also include interaction terms which demonstrate the 
importance of a country’s level of economic freedom to the outcomes of its privatization reform 
and the importance of certain key elements in those reforms which can also influence outcomes.
In  the  literature,  there  is  little  attention paid  to  the  relevance of  various  elements  of 
privatization reforms.  For example,  reforms are often treated the same whether they contain 
provisions for price regulation or not (Pollitt  1995, Competition in Electricity Markets  2001, 
Kitchens  2016).  But  it  is  clear  that  price  regulation  would  have  an  effect  on  the  price  of 
electricity  set  by  electric  utilities  (Auriol  2006).  Conventional  theory  suggests  that  utilities, 
which are often structured as monopolies, would have a great degree of market power, enabling 
them to set prices above perfectly competitive levels. So if privatization has a negative effect on 
prices, we can reasonably infer that price regulation plays a role. For these reasons, I include the 
controls for four elements found in privatization reforms: the allowance of new private entry, 
consumer choice of  electric  utility,  price  regulation,  and fuel  subsidies.  I  have chosen these 
because they relate to government involvement in the industry post-privatization, which would 
be the responsible agent in altering the structure of the utilities from what they would be in a free 
market.
This paper will focus on electric utilities in Latin American countries. I will analyze the 
effect of privatizing public utilities on the price of electricity measured in megawatts per hour 
(MWh),  costs  of  electricity  per  MWh,  and  access  to  electricity  measured  in  two  types  of 
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connections to electrical  power.  The case of electricity will  provide evidence for the overall 
effectiveness of privatization reforms in similarly structured industries.
I hypothesize that the privatization of electric utilities would produce better results along 
the aforementioned lines if they took place in an environment supportive of economic freedom. 
Validating this hypothesis is one objective of this paper. I further hypothesize that, controlling for 
economic  freedom and the  specified elements  of  reforms,  privatization  will  decrease  prices, 
decrease average costs, and increase access to electricity.1
Literature Review
Public  utility  privatization  has  been  examined  across  populations,  with  research 
conducted on Latin America. Representative of this research is Pollitt (1995). It concludes that 
there is very little difference in the effect of private vs public ownership on prices, with the 
empirical evidence being mixed and the theoretical evidence predicting no substantial difference 
(185-186). This work provides the basis for cost considerations in the evaluation of privatization 
as an effective policy. I use as a proxy for efficiency lower costs per unit of electricity sold, 
including  costs  for  capital  and  operations.  Conversely,  Competition  in  Electricity  Markets 
reviews the existing empirical evidence in 2001, concluding that privatization results in lower 
prices  and greater  efficiency (23-24).  The prior  research has  not  undertaken to  consider  the 
influence of a country’s economic freedom on the effectiveness of privatization reforms, and 
neither  has  it  considered  privatization  in  any  way  but  as  an  average  effect.  I  include  four 
elements  of  privatization  reforms—new  private  entry  allowed,  consumer  choice,  price 
regulation,  and fuel  subsidies—which allows me to  differentiate  between reforms instead of 
measuring only the average effect of privatization.
 If I refer to “privatization” only, I mean unspecified or unqualified privatization. That is, privatization 1
without considering a specific element of the reforms.
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Auriol  and  Picard  (2006)  provide  a  theoretical  justification  for  selection  of  certain 
elements in privatization reforms as constituting a distinctive type of privatization. For example, 
the effect of privatizing a public utility on the prices paid by consumers for their product will 
depend  upon  the  inclusion  of  price  regulation  in  the  reform.  Even  if  privatization  led  to 
decreasing costs, these efficiency-benefits might not be passed on to the consumer in the form of 
lower prices. A private utility free to set its own prices may exploit its monopoly and hold prices 
constant together with lower costs yielding a higher profit. Auriol and Picard propose a criterion 
of optimization between consumer welfare and the government’s fiscal health. When a country is 
poor, it may be in its interests to privatize a utility without imposing price controls. This affords 
the poor government the ability to impose taxes on the profitable monopoly. In this situation, the 
government is incapable of obtaining sufficient revenue from other sectors of the economy, but 
in any scenario other than this, it is preferable for the government to impose price controls on 
private  utilities  or  operate  a  utility  itself.  Heretofore,  the  distinctions  between  types  of 
privatization reforms have not been applied to an empirical study. In my study, I recognize the 
heterogeneity of privatization reforms and account for it by including in my model interaction 
terms  for  new  private  entry,  consumer  choice,  price  regulation,  and  fuel  subsidies.  These 
variables are all informed by Auriol and Picard (2006).
An empirical treatment of privatization’s impact on the prices of electricity is performed 
in Kitchens and Jaworski (2016). This paper uses price data from directly before and after the 
United  States’ New Deal.  Government  involvement  in  electric  utilities  increased during this 
period, resulting in a greater amount of public ownership in the industry. Kitchens and Jaworski 
find  that  the  discrepancy  in  prices  offered  by  public  and  private  utilities  pre-reform  were 
relatively small and post-reform negligible. The absence of a significant price discrepancy is 
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contrary  to  conventional  economic  theory.  Municipal  governments  may  have  threatened  to 
convert privately owned electric utilities to public ownership, enforcing price discipline. This 
provides insight into how a privatization reform will impact prices, especially with respect to 
price controls. My research isolates the effect of price regulation, sanctioning the prediction that 
prices may fall if they are controlled by the government.
My research extends or incorporates the concepts developed in the literature. It moves 
beyond  Pollitt  (1995)  with  a  wider  focus  than  the  efficiency  aspect  of  utility  privatization. 
Variables accounting for prices and access to electricity are more informative with regard to the 
total effect of utility privatization on consumer welfare. Consideration of utility privatization’s 
relation  to  consumer  welfare  is  provided  by  Auriol  and  Picard  (2006).  Selection  of  control 
variables related to elements of privatization reforms are largely derived from this paper. My 
research adopts their theoretically derived distinctions between kinds of privatization and applies 
them to an empirical study using regression analysis. Kitchens and Jaworski (2016) supplies the 
empirical  framework for  analysis  of  privatization reforms’ effects  on prices.  It  achieves  this 
indirectly, with the reverse case of private to public reforms considered in their paper and public 
to private considered in my own. It also furnishes the expectation that prices do not substantially 
change with a change from private to public ownership. It does not address access to electricity 
or costs of electricity,  although it  does speculate that private utilities are more efficient than 
public utilities. My research will consider the effect of privatization on three general variables: 
costs,  prices,  and  access.  It  will  also  include  proxy  variables  for  privatization  types.  This 
amounts to a novel empirical investigation of the effects of diverse privatization reforms on the 
aforementioned outcome variables.
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In  addition  to  a  more  nuanced  examination  of  privatization  policies,  my  research 
investigates the effectiveness of reforms in their political-economic context. Using an Index of 
Economic Freedom from the Fraser Institute, I am able to estimate the importance of economic 
freedom. This is the context in which a utility is situated, and I anticipate that it  effects the 
performance of utilities, and it is a completely novel approach as it pertains to privatization.
Data
The  dataset  is  compiled  from  multiple  sources.  Information  regarding  specific 
privatization reforms from the 1990’s,  particularly  in  Latin  America,  was  obtained from the 
World  Bank  page  entitled  “Electricity  Regulation  Database.”  Information  regarding  specific 
utilities was obtained from the World Bank page entitled “Latin America and Caribbean - Utility 
Benchmarking Database.” This dataset provides most of the information which is used in the 
empirical analysis. Information related to the economic freedom of countries to which electric 
utilities belong was obtained from the Fraser Institute’s “Index of Economic Freedom.” 
Data from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre page entitled “The Database: 
Penn  World  Table  version  9.0”  contains  information  on  local  consumer  price  indices  and 
exchange rates. For the primary regressions, I adjust for price inflation with a country’s own CPI 
and transform price variables into logs.
Many variables must be generated in accordance with the empirical methodology. In the 
final dataset, relevant variables include the utility identification number, the year, residential & 
non-residential  connections to power,  average operating,  capital,  and total  costs,  the average 
price of electricity, an interpolated set of economic freedom ranks corresponding to a country in 
a given year, a dummy variable for whether an electric utility is private, and dummy variables for 
different elements of privatization reforms (including the allowance of new private entry into the 
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market, consumer choice of utility, price regulation, and fuel subsidies). The dummy variables of 
the privatization elements are essentially interaction terms, as they are only every equal to one 
when the privatization dummy is equal to one.
The data is fairly aggregated because it looks at the utility level rather than the consumer 
or household level.  Each utility is a large organization covering many people and resources. 
Observations correspond to a utility—designated by an identification code—in a given year, so 
all data refers to a particular utility in a particular year. A limitation of this dataset is in the total 
number of observations it  affords. For example, although it  contains over four-thousand data 
points for electric utilities in various years, it is missing data on the price of electricity for over 
three-quarters of these data points.  When estimating regressions with price as the dependent 
variable, the sample will be limited to just over eight-hundred. Fortunately, the high degree of 
aggregation makes  the  small  dataset  more  powerful.  The sample  size  of  the  regressions  are 
ultimately  limited  by  the  availability  of  the  dependent  variables,  whether  they  be  price  of 
electricity,  access  to  electricity,  or  costs  of  producing  electricity.  This  information  was  not 
collected in many instances for these Latin American utilities.
Ideally, the Fraser Institute’s Index of Economic Freedom would contain a unique rank 
for each year pertaining to a country. The higher the rank, the less free the country is. However, 
prior to the year 2000, economic freedom ranks are assigned only to years which are multiples of 
five. I solve this by interpolating between these years. Unfortunately, this does not fill in all of 
the missing data, making the size of this variable smaller and its contribution less significant.
In addition to the variables described in Table 1,  the dataset contains data from two-
hundred  and  sixty  one  electric  utilities  in  twenty-seven  countries,  including  Antigua  and 
Barbuda,  Argentina,  Belize,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Dominica,  the 
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Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador,  El  Salvador,  Grenada,  Guatemala,  Haiti,  Honduras,  Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The utility statistics in Table 1 are constructed 
using their  identification numbers,  making the statistics other than observations meaningless. 
Average  costs  are  calculated  by  the  aggregate  of  a  utility’s  expenditures—either  operating, 
capital, or total—divided by total MWh’s sold. The sample size available to each regression is 
determined by the variable with the minimum number of observations. In the case of regressions 
concerning the  price  of  electricity,  the  sample  size  will  be  no more than eight-hundred and 
fifteen.
Figure 1 demonstrates the frequency with which the four privatization elements appear in 
the reforms. Fuel subsidies is not as significant as the other four elements, which appear with 
similar frequency. Figure 2 demonstrates the distribution of economic freedom ranks across the 
countries in the sample, taken from the Fraser Institute’s Index of Economic Freedom. Economic 
freedom ranks  are  not  centered on the  mean,  so  countries  will  tend to  be  primarily  free  or 
primarily unfree.
Empirical Analysis
The basic regression specification is:
log(Yit)  =  γi  +  λt  +  ß1Privatizationit  +  ß2Economic  Freedom  Rank*Privatizationit  + 
ß3Economic Freedom Rankit + εit
The dependent variable, Y, signifies six separate dependent variables. These are inflation 
adjusted prices for electricity in megawatts per hour, inflation adjusted operating expenditures 
per  unit  of  electricity,  inflation adjusted  capital  expenditures  per  unit  of  electricity,  inflation 
adjusted total expenditures per unit of electricity, the number of residential connections to power, 
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and the number  of  residential  & non-residential  connections  to  power.  The model  has  fixed 
effects for each individual utility (γi) and for each year (λt). Privatization is a dummy variable (1 
= private) for whether a particular utility is private or not in a given year. Economic Freedom 
Rank specifies a country’s rank on the Index of Economic Freedom—the lower the rank, the 
freer the country. ß1 is the effect of a utility being private on one of the dependent variables, 
conditional upon a country’s economic freedom rank—or level of economic freedom.
The method of this analysis is difference-in-difference using fixed effects for individual 
utilities  and  for  time  by  year.  To  strengthen  the  parallel  trends  assumption,  the  sample  is 
restricted to electric utilities in the same region, Latin America. 
Privatization and economic freedom may or may not be exogenous to the model. I will 
examine some reasons why we might consider these variables as safely exogenous; I will also 
consider some threats to this exogeneity and then attest to the plausibility of these threats. 
Firstly, the economic freedom rank of each country may be considered exogenous to the 
model. It is unlikely that there is any unified force which causes a country to be more or less 
economically free. Policy-makers could be motivated by economic efficiency or well-being but 
also for reasons relating to ideology, political expedience, etc. Since the causes of a country’s 
level of economic freedom are so diverse, we may treat this independent variable as practically 
random. 
A simple linear regression of economic freedom rank on the year a utility was privatized 
reveals a low level of correlation, just 0.0347, statistically significant at the 5% level. Because of 
this, we can assume that the cause of economic freedom and the cause of privatization reforms 
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are not the same. This means that the cause of privatization reforms are probably less diverse 
than the causes of a country’s level of economic freedom. I speculate that the reforms are caused 
primarily by a desire for economic efficiency. According to Auriol and Picard (2006), poorer 
countries find it in their interests to privatize utilities, relieving the government of a large drain 
on its finances.
There is  a  possibility that  the privatization dummy variable,  along with the variables 
representing  the  elements  of  privatization  reforms,  are  endogenous.  A  plausible  cause  of 
privatization reforms would be the poor performance of public utilities. This performance could 
manifest as excessively high electricity prices, bloated costs, and low levels of output. These all 
relate  to  the  dependent  variables  of  my  regressions,  and  they  are  therefore  a  threat  to  the 
credibility of the results. Potentially, the effect of these variables are not as worrisome if we 
assume that the response time of government to these variables is slow. Since the operations of 
government require some time from the recognition of a problem to the implementation of a 
solution,  the  actual  implementation  of  the  reform is  detached from the  initial  causes  of  the 
reform. In the data obtained from the World Bank,  the year  that  private enterprises actually 
entered the market for electricity was often distinct from the year of the privatization reform. The 
year of the reform can be considered the year in which the privatization bill became law. It is 
sometimes the case that private enterprises would enter the market before or after this date. It is 
also plausible that some of the dependent variables constitute less of a threat than others. I would 
contend  that  average  costs  would  be  more  endogenous  than  price  or  connections  to  power. 
Governments are primarily concerned with their budgets, and public utilities can be a drain on 
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their resources. Prices and access to electricity through connections to power affect consumers. 
Costs affect the government. I imagine the democratic systems of these Latin American countries 
would  not  be  very  efficacious  in  producing  sweeping  policy  reforms,  chiefly  because  these 
democracies often do not function as they are ideally supposed to.  We might also consider that 2
the methods by which policy-makers make decisions are not based on the performance of the 
electric  utilities  or  more  generally  economic  efficiency  and  well-being,  but  by  political-
expediency or ideology. Although it is more plausible that decisions would be made along the 
lines of economic efficiency and well-being, if policy-makers did make decisions from the latter 
motivations, then privatization would be more exogenous to the model.
Unfortunately,  there  is  a  persistent  threat  of  endogeneity  concerning the  privatization 
variables, even with the counter-objections defending the exogeneity of the privatization. This 
makes the results of this paper somewhat tenuous, and it must be taken into consideration when 
evaluating  this  research.  I  have,  however,  attempted  to  reduce  this  endogeneity  problem by 
including in the model fixed effects for utilities, including controls for economic freedom and for 
elements of privatization reforms, and looking at the pre-trends of the dependent variables in 
Figures 3 through 8.
The  estimate  for  privatization  without  controls  or  interaction  terms—I  call  this  the 
average, uncontrolled estimate—uses fixed effects for year and for utility and measures the effect 
of  privatization  on  each  of  the  six  dependent  variables.  This  overstates  the  effect  of 
 This is attested to by the economic freedom ranks of these countries, which are always below the top ten 2
(see Figure 2 for a distribution of economic freedom ranks). A free economy is associated with the rule of 
law or the proper functioning of the government (see the Fraser Institute’s methodology for how they 
determine a country’s level of economic freedom).
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undifferentiated privatization if  I  am correct in assuming that privatization is a heterogenous 
variable. It will also overstate the effect of privatization for some countries and understate the 
effect  for  others  based  on  those  countries’ relative  levels  of  economic  freedom.  For  these 
reasons,  I  include controls for elements of privatization reforms as well  as interaction terms 
between  privatization-related  variables  and  economic  freedom.  The  most  complex  models 
resemble this regression specification:
log(Yit) = γi + λt + ß1Privatizationit + ß2Economic Freedom Rank*Privatizationit + ß3Economic 
Freedom Rankit + ß4New Private Entryit + ß5Consumer Choiceit + ß6Price Regulationit + ß7Fuel 
Subsidiesit + ß8New Private Entry*Economic Freedom Rankit + ß9Consumer Choice*Economic 
Freedom Rankit + ß10Price Regulation*Economic Freedom Rankit + ß11Fuel Subsidies*Economic 
Freedom Rankit + εit
Inclusion  of  the  control  variables  is  needed  to  test  a  hypothesis  of  this  paper,  that 
privatization reforms will vary in their success because of a country’s relative level of economic 
freedom. They vary because it  is  easier  to engage in enterprise and productive activity in a 
country  which  promotes  private  property  rights,  has  efficient  and  just  judicial  systems, 
effectively prevents crimes, etc.  It  is  supposed that a relatively freer country will  be able to 
implement a better privatization reform. The interaction terms serve as conditional statements 
such  that  a  reform’s  average  effectiveness  will  be  increased  or  decreased  depending  on  the 
economic freedom rank of the country. Controls obtained directly from the original data are the 
dummy for privatization and the economic freedom ranks of countries. The dummy variables for 
privatization elements—including new private entry, consumer choice, price regulation, and fuel 
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subsidies—are only equal to one when the dummy for privatization is equal to one, making them 
implicit interaction terms, and this is why I list them as interaction terms in Table 4. I use this 
framework for unspecified privatization and all of the elements of privatization bills included in 
the model.
Figures 3 to 8 show the change of the dependent variables across time, respectively. A 
balanced  panel  is  used  for  each  of  them.  These  graphs  include  only  those  countries  which 
underwent privatization during the period of time available in this data; any inferences which are 
made from these graphs must take into consideration that fixed effects and the control samples 
are not included, unlike with the regressions.
Figure 3 is a graph of average wholesale prices of electricity over a standardized unit of 
time. The y-axis measures the relative change of prices so as to standardize across different 
currencies. I use this approach for the graphs illustrating average costs over time in Figures 6, 7, 
and 8. In Figure 3, there is very little variation in price before the time of privatization. After 
privatization, the trend remains similar, until later when prices increase. Kitchens and Jaworski 
(2016) reveals very little discrepancy in the prices offered by public utilities and those offered by 
private utilities. This initial evidence supports their findings.
Figures 4 shows the change of residential connections to power over time, and Figure 5 
shows the change of residential & non-residential connections to power over time.  The trends 3
for  both are  the same.  Prior  to  privatization,  both increase at  a  modest  rate.  At  the time of 
 Population is not controlled for in Figures 4 or 5, and so a steady increase in connections to power at the 3
time of privatization (Time = 0) should be interpreted as little to no change effected by the act of 
privatization. Over time, however, privatization may bear fruit, and this is what can be revealed in the 
regression analysis.
 13
Author: Connor Pardini Advisor: Alisa Tazhitdinova
Professor: Heather Royer
privatization, the pre-trend continues at roughly the same slope. There does not appear to be any 
disturbance at the time of privatization, and so these variables may be influenced by factors other 
than privatization. Possibly, they are influenced by only one element of privatization while being 
unaffected by others, as is revealed in a subsequent section of this paper, in which the regressions 
in  Table  4  show  the  statistical  significance  of  fuel  subsidies  for  both  variables  concerning 
connections to power.
As seen in Figure 6, average operating expenditures do not show a very disconnected 
trend  before  and  after  the  time  of  privatization.  After  privatization,  average  costs  increase 
slightly faster over time and then dip. In Figure 8, average total costs exhibit a similar trend as 
operating costs. For both of them, average costs decrease toward the end. That is, privatization 
may not have an immediate effect on these costs, but after private owners have been operating 
the utilities for a period of time the benefits may manifest.
Figure 7 shows the change of average capital costs over time. Confidence intervals in this 
graph are  extremely small  because the  average capital  costs  in  these  years  for  many of  the 
utilities in this sample were zero or close to zero. Consequently, inferences cannot confidently be 
made from this graph. Regardless, it shows higher average costs after privatization than before, 
similar to the graphs for average operating and total costs.
Results
As previously stated, my hypotheses concerning the results of this research are for prices 
of  electricity—measured by the log of  wholesale prices per MWh—to decrease,  for  average 
operating,  capital,  and  total  costs  to  decrease,—measured  by  the  log  of  costs  per  unit  of 
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electricity  produced—and  for  the  number  of  connections  to  power,  both  residential  and 
residential & non-residential, to increase—measured with logs. Furthermore, I hypothesized that 
a privatization reform enacted in a relatively free country according to the Index of Economic 
Freedom would be more effective at achieving its aims. The preliminary evidence suggested that, 
absent  controls  for  elements  of  privatization  and  levels  of  economic  freedom,  my  initial 
hypotheses could be incorrect.
Referring  to  Table  2,  privatization  is  shown  to  increase  the  price  of  electricity  by 
260.84% in  the  average,  uncontrolled  estimate,  or  regression  (1).  This  result  is  statistically 
significant at the 1% level and contradicts the findings of Kitchens and Jaworski, which saw very 
little disparity between the prices of public and private utilities. The addition of control variables 
in regression (2) increases the adjusted R2, strengthening the explanatory power of the model. 
Both the estimate of the dummy for privatization and the interaction term between privatization 
and economic freedom are significant at the 1% level in this regression. 
For an average level of economic freedom,—a rank of 67.32—privatization decreases 
prices by 99.65%, using regression (1) in Table 4. This result differs strongly from the average, 
uncontrolled  estimate.  The  results  also  reveal  that  in  freer  countries,  the  negative  effect  of 
privatization is stronger. In more authoritarian countries, the negative effect of privatization is 
non-existent. For a country with a rank on the Index of Economic Freedom of 12, prices are 
expected to decrease by 788.38%. For a country with a rank of 139,  prices are expected to 
increase by 792.77%. The economic freedom interval is therefore (-788.38%, 792.77%). The gap 
between my estimate of privatization’s effect on prices and Kitchens and Jaworski’s (2016) is 
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explained  through  the  incorporation  of  the  economic  freedom  control  and  interaction  with 
privatization, since this prior literature examined only a single country with a relatively uniform 
level of economic freedom throughout.
I measure access to electricity as the number of connections to power, both residential 
and the  combination of  residential  & non-residential.  Referring to  Table  2,   in  the  average, 
uncontrolled  estimate,  or  regression  (3),  unspecified  privatization  increases  residential 
connections by 3.62%. Residential & non-residential connections increase by 5.07%. Both of 
these estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. Economic freedom and its interaction 
with privatization are added in regression (4) and (6). Both are significant at the 1% level for 
residential connections, but for residential & non-residential connections, only the interaction 
term is significant.
For the dependent variables representing access to electricity in regressions (2) and (3) of 
Table 4, the effect of privatization in a mean-ranked country is a 10.71% increase in residential 
connections  and  a  9.75%  increase  for  residential  &  non-residential  connections.  All  of  the 
coefficients used to make this calculation are significant at the 1% level. The economic freedom 
interval for residential connections is (27.86%, -11.51%) and for residential & non-residential 
connections is (22.47%, -6.74%). These intervals demonstrate that privatization reforms are more 
successful in achieving the goal of greater access to electricity when they take place in freer 
countries.
As  opposed  to  the  regressions  using  the  price  and  access  dependent  variables,  the 
regressions estimating the effect of privatization on costs per unit of electricity in regressions (1), 
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(3), and (5) of Table 3 are not adequately statistically significant until control variables are added. 
When  the  control  variables  are  added  to  average  operating  expenditures,  all  variables  in 
regression (2) become significant at the 1% level. Using regression (4) of Table 4, privatization is 
shown to increase this cost by 28.09% for an average country. However privatization’s effect on 
average capital expenditures is only significant at the 5% level if economic freedom and the 
interaction term are included. Although operating costs do increase for the average country, the 
economic  freedom  interval  is  (-98.59%,  192.24%),  meaning  this  variable  follows  the 
hypothesized pattern that privatization reforms would be more effective in freer countries. Since 
Pollitt (1995) does not control for economic freedom and instead estimates a form of average 
efficiency,  the  results  of  my  research  lend  him  support.  However,  since  privatization  does 
decrease costs for some countries—namely, those which are economically free—it can be said 
that privatization sometimes reduces costs and leads to greater efficiency, according with the 
results of Competition in Electricity Markets (2001).
Average  capital  expenditures  are  not  significant  at  all  in  the  average,  uncontrolled 
estimate, and only achieve significance at the 5% level in the other regressions. In regressions 
(4),  (5),  and  (6)  of  Table  4,  only  one  of  the  interaction  terms  related  to  the  elements  of 
privatization reforms is statistically significant, and so the estimates of the effect of privatization 
on average capital costs do not change very much with the addition of these other variables. A 
weak  estimation  of  privatization’s  effect  on  average  capital  expenditures  is  an  increase  of 
41.87% for utilities  in a mean-ranked country—refer  to regression (5)  of  Table 4.  A similar 
pattern  emerges  with  regard  to  average  total  expenditures.  The  coefficient  of  the  average, 
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uncontrolled  estimate  in  regression  (5)  of  Table  3  is  only  significant  at  the  10%  level. 
Privatization is shown to reliably increase average total expenditures by 28.09% for a mean-
ranked country, calculated with regression (6) of Table 4. This is very similar to the estimate of 
privatization’s  effect  on  average  operating  expenditures,  likely  because  total  expenditures  is 
primarily composed of operating expenditures. The results on costs show that, for utility in a 
country ranked average on the Index of Economic Freedom, average costs will increase, contrary 
to my hypothesis that privatization would cause utilities to become more efficient and thereby 
reduce average costs.  However,  the economic freedom interval for capital  costs is (-64.34%, 
179.5%) and (-98.59%, 192.24%) for total costs, in accordance with my original hypothesis that 
privatization reforms are more effective in freer countries. 
Table 4 contains regressions for each of the dependent variables and includes all controls 
and interaction terms. For regression (1) concerning the price of electricity, almost all of the 
interaction terms are statistically significant at the 1% level. Only the interaction of economic 
freedom with privatization and fuel subsidies is completely insignificant. The magnitudes of the 
coefficients  for  new private  entry,  consumer choice,  and price regulation are quite  large.  Of 
particular interest is price regulation, which when combined with its corresponding interaction 
term is shown to dramatically reduce prices for more economically free countries and raise prices 
for more economically authoritarian countries—the economic freedom interval is (-1540.55%, 
328.89%). This makes sense if average costs drop in more economically free countries, making it 
feasible for governments to set price controls that track these lower costs. Another large and 
significant estimate is that of new private entry allowed into the market for electricity, as well as 
 18
Author: Connor Pardini Advisor: Alisa Tazhitdinova
Professor: Heather Royer
its corresponding interaction term. The economic freedom interval is (2780.97%, -1379.55%), 
demonstrating a wide discrepancy between the element’s effect in freer and less free countries. 
The allowance of new private entry actually increases prices in freer countries and decreases 
them in less free countries.4
Interaction terms representing the elements of privatization reforms for regressions (2) 
and  (3)  of  Table  4  concerning  access  to  electricity  are  for  the  most  part  not  statistically 
significant. Only fuel subsidies are significant at the 1% level for either. This is similar to the 
element-variables  in  regressions  (4)  through  (6)  related  to  costs,  where  there  is  almost  no 
statistical significance. In contrast, the element-variables are quite significant for regression (1), 
meaning the  differentiation of  certain  characteristics  for  privatization reforms is  pertinent  to 
privatization’s  effect  on  the  price  of  electricity,  but  not  as  much for  its  effect  on  access  to 
electricity or average costs. This is intuitive for average costs,—a metric to test for efficiency—
for all that should matter in incentivizing efficiency is the introduction of the profit motive. In 
line with Pollitt (1995), of importance is whether or not the utility is private at all, not how it is 
private. That fuel subsidies are statically significant for access to electricity makes sense, since 
the utility will likely only undertake to expand production and output if it receives a financial 
incentive. If prices are low, utilities will not be able to expand without savings of their own, and 
 While this may seem surprising, Auriol and Picard (2006) provides a theoretical explanation for why 4
this is so. Heavily regulated or public electric utilities are generally most productive of consumer welfare, 
and so the introduction of a market characterized by free entry will likely not yield the benefits that it 
would in countries with already relatively well-run utilities. In countries with relatively poor-run utilities
—which I assume are the less economically free countries—a market characterized by free entry may be a 
step up from their status quo.
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so they will require government assistance. If prices are high, perhaps because of an absence of 
price regulation, there will be no incentive to expand production.
The elements concerning new private entry,  consumer choice,  and price regulation in 
regression (1) of Table 4 are, together with their respective interactions with economic freedom, 
significant  at  the 1% level.  A higher economic freedom rank—meaning the country is  more 
authoritarian—makes  the  contribution  of  new  private  entry  to  lower  prices  more  negative. 
Furthermore, a higher rank makes the contributions of consumer choice and price regulation 
more positive. For the freest country, new private entry will increase prices, but consumer choice 
and price regulation will decrease prices. These results indicate that Kitchens and Jaworski’s 
method of treating privatization as an average did not capture the whole truth, as the intricacies 
of the reforms makes a difference in the outcome concerning the price of electricity. 
Conclusion
The hypotheses of this paper are somewhat supported by the results. For electric utilities 
in  countries  with  an  average  rank  on  the  Index  of  Economic  Freedom,  it  is  shown  that 
privatization,  without  considering  any  of  the  possible  elements  in  privatization  reforms, 
decreases  the  price  of  electricity  and  increases  access  through  more  connections  to  power. 
Although average  costs  are  not  shown to  decrease  for  the  average  ranked  country,  they  do 
decrease for utilities in more economically free countries. The second part of the hypothesis, that 
privatization is more effective at achieving its aims in freer countries, is strongly indicated by the 
results. Privatization is shown to be more effective with every single dependent variable if it 
takes place within a relatively economically free country.
 20
Author: Connor Pardini Advisor: Alisa Tazhitdinova
Professor: Heather Royer
The results  of  this  paper  can be used as  tools  in  thinking about  privatization policy. 
Evidence that privatization can decrease prices, decrease average costs, and increase access to 
electricity—tangible metrics for human welfare—is useful to the policy-maker. It is also useful 
as a basis for further research, which would ideally incorporate more sophisticated techniques for 
measuring efficiency and consumer welfare. Perhaps the strongest conclusion of this paper is that 
it is generally better to pursue economic freedom. 
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Observations Mean S.D. Min Max
Regressors:
Privatization 3704.000 0.435 0.496 0.000 1.000
Economic Freedom Rank 3587.000 67.318 32.060 12.000 139.000
Privatization Elements
New Private Entry 4073.000 0.201 0.401 0.000 1.000
Consumer Choice 4073.000 0.196 0.397 0.000 1.000
Price Regulation 4073.000 0.190 0.392 0.000 1.000
Fuel Subsidies 4073.000 0.061 0.239 0.000 1.000
Fixed Effects Variables
Year 4073.000 1998.736 5.597 1973.000 2008.000
Utility 4064.000 115150.000 92597.050 108.000 304013.000
Dependent Variables:
Price of Electricity
Wholesale Price per MWh 815.000 123986.400 263401.400 0.393 1940039.000
Access to Electricity
Residential and Non-Residential Connections 2905.000 609610.900 1681441.000 62.000 26300000.000
Residential Connections 2920.000 534214.400 1470200.000 0.000 23200000.000
Costs of Electricity
Average Operating Expenditures 1253.000 101510.800 299987.000 0.000 2743820.000
Average Capital Expenditures 1120.000 11236.780 35010.150 0.001 422593.200
Average Total Expenditures 1253.000 101510.800 299987.000 0.000 2743820.000
All prices are  in local nominal currencies and adjusted for inflation. The economic freedom rank is interpolated.











FIGURE 1: PROPORTION OF 
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Author: Connor Pardini Advisor: Alisa Tazhitdinova
Professor: Heather Royer
 31
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Privatized or not 2.6084*** -4.8650*** 0.0362*** 0.1875*** 0.0507*** 0.1487***
(0.3758) (1.4989) (0.0100) (0.0220) (0.0093) (0.0205)
Privatization*Economic Freedom 0.0755*** -0.0020*** -0.0014***
(0.0172) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Economic Freedom Rank -0.1207*** 0.0006*** 0.0001
(0.0052) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Constant 5.8419*** 17.6129*** 9.7420*** 9.7965*** 10.2576*** 10.3004***
(0.6208) (0.8256) (0.0256) (0.0286) (0.0398) (0.0396)
Utility Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 790 745 2,770 2,483 2,736 2,472
Adjusted R-squared 0.7088 0.8327 0.9949 0.9952 0.9948 0.9953
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Log of Wholesale Price (CPI 
Adjusted)
Log of Residential 
Connections to Power
Log of Residential and Non-
Residential Connections to 
Power
Table 2: Basic Estimates for Price and Access to Electricity
Each column is a separate regression. Variables on the left are regressors. Fixed effects 
for utility and year are included for all regressions. Asterisks are degrees of significance.
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Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Privatized or not 0.3833* -1.2442*** 0.2490 -0.8764** 0.3833* -1.2442***
(0.2051) (0.3293) (0.2003) (0.4300) (0.2051) (0.3293)
Privatization*Economic Freedom 0.0226*** 0.0158*** 0.0226***
(0.0052) (0.0047) (0.0052)
Economic Freedom Rank -0.0376*** -0.0011 -0.0376***
(0.0083) (0.0043) (0.0083)
Constant 7.9428*** 13.6325*** 7.3344*** 8.9958*** 7.9428*** 13.6325***
(0.8915) (1.4705) (1.2499) (2.0686) (0.8915) (1.4705)
Utility Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,167 1,101 1,057 1,011 1,167 1,101
Adjusted R-squared 0.8962 0.9016 0.9261 0.9263 0.8962 0.9016
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Each column is a separate regression. Variables on the left are regressors. Fixed effects for 
utility and year are included for all regressions. Asterisks are degrees of significance.
Log of Average Operating 
Expenditures (CPI Adjusted)
Log of Average Capital 
Expenditures (CPI Adjusted)
Log of Average Total 
Expenditures (CPI Adjusted)
Table 3: Basic Estimates for Average Costs of Electricity





























Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Privatized or not -9.3778*** 0.3158*** 0.2523*** -1.2607*** -0.8738** -1.2607***
(1.4098) (0.0278) (0.0245) (0.3246) (0.4394) (0.3246)
Privatization*Economic Freedom 0.1245*** -0.0031*** -0.0023*** 0.0229*** 0.0192*** 0.0229***
(0.0157) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0054) (0.0048) (0.0054)
Economic Freedom Rank -0.1215*** 0.0013*** 0.0005** -0.0376*** -0.0018 -0.0376***
(0.0052) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0087) (0.0042) (0.0087)
Privatized*New Private Entry 31.7409*** 0.1451 0.3138 51.1177 -8.2121 51.1177
(5.9389) (0.1938) (0.1980) (39.8702) (7.4715) (39.8702)
Privatized*Consumer Choice -16.1678*** -0.1781* -0.1768 -26.9517 -3.2189*** -26.9517
(3.0168) (0.0993) (0.1684) (19.9443) (1.0009) (19.9443)
Privatized*Price Regulation -17.1719*** -0.0868 -0.2235 -29.2717 8.5896 -29.2717
(4.4764) (0.1706) (0.1425) (19.9615) (7.4010) (19.9615)
Privatized*Fuel Subsidies -5.2120*** -0.2065*** -0.2306*** -22.8239 0.6756 -22.8239
(1.2301) (0.0347) (0.0497) (19.9238) (1.2335) (19.9238)
Privatization*New Private Entry -0.3276*** 0.0009 0.0000 -0.5343 0.0870 -0.5343
(0.0791) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.4186) (0.0725) (0.4186)
Privatization*Consumer Choice 0.2087*** 0.0004 0.0008 0.2629 0.0117 0.2629
(0.0625) (0.0019) (0.0033) (0.2096) (0.0130) (0.2096)
Privatization*Price Regulation 0.1472** -0.0021 -0.0016 0.2884 -0.0999 0.2884
(0.0687) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.2099) (0.0719) (0.2099)
Privatization*Fuel Subsidies - 0.0011 0.0013 0.2472 -0.0218 0.2472
(0.0012) (0.0021) (0.2091) (0.0171) (0.2091)
Constant 18.9874*** 9.6463*** 10.0602*** 13.6267*** 8.9224*** 13.6267***
(0.7997) (0.0435) (0.0354) (1.4884) (2.0286) (1.4884)
Utility Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 745 2,483 2,472 1,101 1,011 1,101
Adjusted R-squared 0.8369 0.9956 0.9956 0.9019 0.9301 0.9019
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Estimates with Controls and Interaction Terms for all Outcome Variables
Interaction of Specified Privatization Interaction Term with Economic Freedom
Each column is a separate regression. Variables on the left are regressors. Fixed effects for 
utility and year are included for all regressions. Asterisks are degrees of significance.
